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COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE FRANK M. HULL
BY JOSEPH S. NORMAN II
as defined by Section 351 (a)
title 28 U.S.C.
This complaint is due to the obvious appearance of fraud
and/or participation in conduct that is prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts by Judge Hull. The other
Court of Appeals judges involved in the case under
question were Dubina and Tjoflat. In writing the
opinion Judge Hull states:
II STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim, construing all allegations
in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Lowell v. American Cynamid
Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1229 ( 11th Cir. 1999);
Harper v. Thomas, 988 F2d 101, 103 (11th Cir.1993).
A complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts, which would entitle plaintiff to relief. Hall
v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 157 F 3d 1286, 1288 (11th
Cir. 1998); Terry v. Cook, 866 F2d 373, 375 (11th
Cir 1989).
Our
review of a summary judgment order is also de novo.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5TH EDITION
Fraud. "An intentional perversion of
truth for the purposes of inducing another in reliance
upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to
him or to surrender a legal right. A false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives and is intended to deceive another so
that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."
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Using the definition of fraud found in Black’s Law
Dictionary, Judge Hull perpetrated fraud when the
STANDARD OF REVIEW was presented. During the
judicial evaluation process of my complaint there was
zero judicial comment on the evidence and case law that
supported the complaint. The defendant’s did not
comment on any case law and evidence nor did they
provide any case law to support their defense. The
court did not provide any case law on which they relied
in reaching their conclusions. The court did
contradict circuit case law on the identical issue when
it reached conclusions in this case.
Fraudulent representations by Judge Frank M.
Hull constitutes bad conduct that is prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS OF THE CASE
The case number is 97-5587 –CV-EBD in the UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT.
Joseph S. Norman II (Norman) was a named
Plaintiff/Appellant in this case. Norman was one of
hundreds of airline pilots who brought suit against the
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) and certain officials
of the union regarding the publication and distribution
of a defamatory list of “SCAB” airline pilots that
worked for Eastern Airlines during the sympathy strike
of 1989. Norman was never more than a pilot trainee
during this job dispute yet his name is on the “SCAB”
list. Norman filed an appeal to the 11th Circuit
from the Southern District of Florida pro se.
On
October 25, 1999 the 11th Circuit ruled in favor
of the Defendants. Judge Hull wrote the majority
opinion and stated regarding all Appellants, apparently,
except Norman.
“the Eastern MEC unanimously adopted a formal resolution
to “publish a finalized list of strike breaking pilots
at the conclusion of the ALPA sympathy strike” and “ to
bring internal union charges under ALPA’s constitution
Against ALPA members who crossed the picket lines.
Individuals were placed on this list of working pilots
only upon receipt of two confirmed reports that they had
crossed ALPA picket lines, and after being provided with
“an opportunity to refute the allegation” that they had
crossed picket lines to fly for Eastern.”
and
“During the sympathy strike, ALPA had compiled a “scabs”
list of pilots who crossed union picket lines to fly for
Eastern.”
Norman notes in this complaint the operative word used
in both statements by the court majority is fly. The
word fly is used to define the work done
which qualified a name to be placed on the “SCAB” list.
The word “fly” in any tense (fly, flew,
flown) was never applicable to the activity of Norman
during the Eastern strike, a fact that was repeatedly
made known to the court.
And the Court states:
“This court reviews de novo the dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim, construing all allegations
in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.”
In addressing Appellant Norman, Judge Hull writing for
the majority states:
“Norman’s contentions lack merit. The record
shows that Norman was hired by Eastern as a DC-9 Captain
and received compensation while in training. One
of his job requirements was to participate in the pilot
training program. Under these circumstances, Norman was
“working” for Eastern in the ordinary sense of the term.
It is this colloquial use of “working”- and not
Norman’s legal classification under the Railway Labor
Act-that is relevant in determining whether
“scab” can be applied to him. Consequently, ALPA
had no additional reason to know that Norman was not a
SCAB; his situation is therefore no different from all
the other pilots who worked despite the strike.”
Just why a United States Court of Appeals Judge is
not obliged to use “legal classification”
when representing all evidence is considered de novo
warrants independent inquiry.
During the Eastern strike of 1989 the circumstances of
Norman were no different than the circumstances of
hundreds of other pilot trainees. The names of
the other trainees are not on the “SCAB” list while the
name of Norman is. The 11th Circuit in EASTERN
AIRLINES INC. v ALPA et al., 920 F 2d 722, Dec.
20 1990, clearly addressed trainee status in the Eastern
strike. The 11th Circuit determined trainees were not
“working Eastern pilots” plain and simple. It
is interesting to note that the standard of “SCAB” of
Judge Hull for the other Plaintiffs in this case
required them to fly for Eastern, but the standard Judge
Hull established only for Norman was different.
Norman did not have to fly for Eastern during the ALPA
strike to be labeled “SCAB”. In fact, Norman has
never flown an airplane for Eastern in his life and was
not given the opportunity to refute the allegation he
flew during the strike, as the courts believed.
Norman has always been an ALPA member in good standing
and was not brought up under union charges Article VIII
of strike breaking as were the ALPA members who crossed
the picket lines to fly.
Defendants have represented there was daily monitoring
of those who flew aircraft during the strike so that any
union privileges could immediately be curtailed for
those crossing their picket lines to fly. The
privileges were never curtailed for Norman as evidenced
by his union membership cards and other documentation,
which is in the record, and was continually provided by
the Defendants to Norman. With this daily
monitoring ALPA knew Norman was not a SCAB.
Judge Hull incorrectly reasoned “Consequently, ALPA
had no additional reason to know that Norman was not a
scab”. Had any of the documentation provided to
Norman, by the Defendant’s, been legitimately construed
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff (Norman) or
had Judge Hull legitimately considered 11th Circuit case
law on trainees the conclusions reached would have
certainly been different.
The
majority opinion in this case concluded Norman was a
“SCAB” because he received compensation while in pilot
training. The treatment of Norman while in
training was no different than other pilot trainees
during the Eastern work dispute and the Courts
determined in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, et al.,
744 F. Supp. 1140, S.D. Fla., 1990 and the 11th Circuit
in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA et al., 920 F
2d 722, Dec. 20, 1990 that trainee pilots who had not
completed the airline training program and initial
operating experience, had not obtained Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) certificate, and had not started
flying revenue flights were not “working Eastern
pilots”. They had not performed work ordinarily
discharged by striking pilots and they were not
employees protected by the Railway Labor Act. By
this definition of Judge Edward Davis and the 11th
Circuit Norman never crossed a picket line to do
work for Eastern Air Lines. The other Plaintiff’s
in the case did cross the picket lines to “work”, i.e.
fly.
Compensation has never been an issue in any airline
trainee case law – never - the issue always boils down
to whether or not the trainee has participated in a
revenue flight. A pilot looses his / her trainee
status and becomes a pilot for the carrier on strike the
minute a revenue flight begins- a definition well
established in industry practice and case law.
That definition is also used by the Defendants and is
why Norman was never accused of strike breaking under
the union Constitution and Bylaws. .
Judge Hull needs to explain, how the represented
STANDARD OF REVIEW was adhered to with the mound
of repeatedly presented case law and evidence in the
case record. Judge Hull needs to explain just why
11th Circuit case law was contradicted to the
benefit of the same defendant –the Airline Pilots
Association (ALPA). Judge Hull also needs to
comment on the evidence presented by Norman in this
case. If the explanations for her actions are not of
sufficient quality she should be asked to tender her
resignation to preserve citizen confidence in the
justice system and the case should be remanded to
District Court for proper review.
If
Judge Hull can provide a proper explanation to the
issues raised in this complaint I will humbly apologize
for any inconvenience and withdraw this complaint.
In
the interest of preserving public confidence in the
ability of this circuit to review misconduct complaints,
I suggest the review be published and made available on
line as the JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT has
done. See attached.
Respectfully submitted this the 7th day of June, 2004
Joseph S. Norman II, pro se
Santa Anita Dr.
Tallahassee, FL 32309
Phone: (850) 893-1484
CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE
Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner
Chairman House
Judiciary Committee
2449 Rayburn House
Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.
20515
Justice Stephen G.
Breyer
SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
One First Street
N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20543
Mr. Blaine Merritt
Council to the
House Sub Committee of the Courts
B-351A
Rayburn House Office Bldg.
Washington,
D.C. 20515 |
Scott
A. McMillan
